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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Rafael Guerrero-Sanchez, a native and citizen of 
Mexico whose original removal order was reinstated pursuant 
to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5), was detained by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) from May 2015 to February 
2017 while he awaited the Immigration Court’s decision on 
whether he would be afforded country-specific protection from 
removal.  The District Court determined that his detention was 
governed by the pre-removal detention provision of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), 
which affords aliens a right to a bond hearing before an 
immigration judge to determine if the alien’s detention is 
necessary while he or she awaits immigration proceedings.  At 
the hearing, the District Court determined that Guerrero-
Sanchez posed neither a flight risk nor a danger to society, and 
therefore released him on bail after 637 days in civil 
confinement.   
 The Government appeals solely the District Court’s 
determination of the source of Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention, 
which it contends is 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), the post-removal 
detention authority provision of the INA.  In stark contrast to 
§ 1226(a), the text of § 1231(a) does not explicitly authorize a 
bond hearing.  Guerrero-Sanchez, however, contends that his 
detention raises constitutional concerns even under § 1231(a), 
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and therefore that Congress implicitly intended for that 
provision to compel a bond hearing after prolonged detention.  
Thus, in Guerrero-Sanchez’s estimation, he was owed a bond 
hearing regardless of the statutory source of his detention.    
 Accordingly, this case requires us to decide a novel 
question of immigration law in this Circuit: is the detention of 
an alien, such as Guerrero-Sanchez, who has a reinstated order 
of removal but is also pursuing withholding-only relief 
governed by § 1226(a) or § 1231(a)?  If the former, then such 
aliens are statutorily permitted to a bond hearing.  But if we 
find that § 1231(a) controls, then we must answer a second 
question: does § 1231(a)(6) compel an implicit bond hearing 
requirement after prolonged detention?   
 For the reasons discussed below, we hold that § 1231(a) 
governs Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention and that § 1231(a)(6) 
affords a bond hearing after prolonged detention to any alien 
who falls within the ambit of that provision.  We will therefore 
affirm on alternative grounds the District Court’s decision to 
afford Guerrero-Sanchez a bond hearing. 
I.FACTS 
 Guerrero-Sanchez attempted to unlawfully enter the 
United States from Mexico on January 24, 1998 by presenting 
a fraudulent birth certificate.  U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection determined that he was inadmissible for having 
sought admission by fraud or misrepresentation, in violation of 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).  An expedited order of removal 
was entered against him, see 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i), and 
he was immediately removed back to Mexico. 
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 At an unknown date thereafter, Guerrero-Sanchez re-
entered the United States without inspection.  In April 2012, he 
was arrested for his role in an Idaho-based drug trafficking 
organization.  Guerrero-Sanchez pled guilty to one count of 
conspiracy to distribute more than fifty grams of 
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 
841(a)(1), and he was sentenced to forty-two months of 
imprisonment.  While Guerrero-Sanchez was serving that 
sentence, ICE reinstated his original order of removal from 
1998, pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).  On April 9, 2015, 
Guerrero-Sanchez filed before this Court a petition for review 
and motion for stay of the reinstated removal order, which were 
denied.  
 On May 19, 2015, the date that Guerrero-Sanchez 
completed his sentence, he was transferred to ICE custody 
pending his removal.  An asylum officer subsequently 
conducted a reasonable-fear interview at Guerrero-Sanchez’s 
request, see 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(e), where Guerrero-Sanchez 
contended that he would be tortured by a drug cartel if removed 
to Mexico.  The officer concluded that Guerrero-Sanchez’s 
fear of persecution was reasonable and referred the matter to 
an immigration judge.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.31(e).    
 Guerrero-Sanchez subsequently initiated withholding-
only proceedings before the Immigration Court, seeking an 
order either withholding his removal to Mexico pursuant to 8 
U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) or, in the alternative, deferring his removal 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  The 
Immigration Judge denied both claims, finding that he was 
ineligible for relief under § 1231(b)(3) because he committed 
a “particularly serious crime,” see § 1231(b)(3)(B)(ii), and that 
he did not qualify for CAT relief because he did “not [meet] 
his burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence 
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that the Mexican Government would consent to or be willfully 
blind to [his] hypothetical torture . . . .”  App. 120.   Guerrero-
Sanchez appealed the denial of his CAT claim to the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), which affirmed the 
Immigration Judge.  He then petitioned this Court for review 
of the BIA’s order, and we stayed his removal pending the 
disposition of his appeal.  
 We granted the petition of review, finding that “the BIA 
erred by failing to consider whether the record evidence of the 
violence caused by the [drug] cartel and corruption of law 
enforcement officials demonstrated that it is more likely than 
not that Guerrero will be tortured ‘by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other 
person acting in an official capacity.’” Guerrero v. Attorney 
Gen., 672 F. App’x 188, 191 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1208.18(a)(1)).  We therefore vacated the BIA’s order and 
remanded for further consideration.   
 On December 17, 2015, while his case remained 
pending before the BIA, Guerrero-Sanchez filed a petition for 
a writ of habeas corpus before the District Court, challenging 
his detention by ICE while he waits for a determination on 
whether he will be afforded country-specific protection from 
removal.  To date, his withholding-only proceeding is not 
scheduled until September 5, 2019, which is fifty-three months 
from the date that he was originally detained by ICE.  On 
September 19, 2016, the District Court granted the petition, 
finding that Guerrero-Sanchez was statutorily permitted to a 
bond hearing because his detention was governed by the pre-
removal order detention statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), rather 
than the post-removal statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).  The District 
Court therefore ordered that the Immigration Judge afford 
Guerrero-Sanchez a hearing within twenty-one days.    
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 At the hearing, the Immigration Judge denied Guerrero-
Sanchez release on bond, finding that he represented a flight 
risk and/or danger to the community.  Following the bond 
hearing before the Immigration Judge, Guerrero-Sanchez filed 
a motion to reconsider and “to enforce” the District Court’s 
order, claiming that the bond hearing had been legally deficient 
and requesting that the District Court conduct the hearing 
itself.  The District Court granted the motion in part on 
December 23, 2016, finding that the bond hearing was legally 
insufficient because it was not individualized, did not account 
for the evidence of rehabilitation that Guerrero-Sanchez 
provided, and that it was “doubtful” that the Government 
carried its burden of proof that he is a flight risk or a danger to 
the community.  App. 40.   
 The District Court then, in February 2017, held a bond 
hearing itself.  It found that Guerrero-Sanchez did not pose a 
danger to the community because of “the absence of any 
criminal history beyond his drug conspiracy conviction, 
acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct, extensive 
evidence of rehabilitation and good conduct while incarcerated 
and detained, multiple offers of support from family and 
employers if he were to be released, and numerous sworn 
statements attesting to [his] good character.”  App. 19.  The 
District Court also determined that Guerrero-Sanchez was not 
a flight risk because he has a wife and daughter living in Las 
Vegas, Nevada, that he was pursuing a bona fide withholding 
of removal claim before the Immigration Court, and that the 
conditions of release would assure that he appeared at future 
immigration proceedings.  It therefore ordered his immediate 
release subject to conditions of supervision.  In total, Guerrero-
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Sanchez had remained in ICE detention for 637 days without a 
bond hearing.1 
II.THE AUTHORITY GOVERNING GUERRERO-
SANCHEZ’S DETENTION 
 The Government originally appealed the District 
Court’s order holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governs 
Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention, as well as the orders mandating 
a de novo hearing in federal court and releasing him on bond.  
It then withdrew its appeals of the latter two determinations.  
Thus, the Government now contests only the statutory basis of 
Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention.   In the Government’s view, it 
is not the pre-removal detention provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), 
that controls in Guerrero-Sanchez’s case, but rather, the post-
removal detention provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a).  Because 
§ 1231(a) contains no explicit bond hearing requirement, the 
Government argues that such a hearing should have never been 
held, and that the Government should have the authority to 
detain Guerrero-Sanchez again.2  For his part, Guerrero-
                                              
1 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, and we have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253.   
 
2 In the alternative, the Government argues that, should 
§ 1226 govern, then a different subsection of the provision—
§ 1226(c)—applies.  That subsection “carves out a statutory 
category of aliens who may not be released under § 1226(a).”  
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018).  It provides 
that the “Attorney General shall take into custody any alien,” 
who commits one of various enumerated categories of criminal 
and terrorist offenses, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), including a violation 
of “any law or regulation of a State, the United States, or a 
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Sanchez contends that the District Court was correct in 
concluding that § 1226(a) applies, but that even if § 1231(a) 
governs, he was still entitled to a bond hearing because 
§ 1231(a)(6) implicitly requires a bond hearing after prolonged 
detention.  Thus, according to Guerrero-Sanchez, he was 
entitled to a bond hearing irrespective of the statutory authority 
for his detention, and he should remain released subject to the 
conditions of supervision already in place.   
 With all of this in mind, we must first decide whether 
Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention is governed by § 1226(a) or 
§ 1231(a).  Because this question is an issue of statutory 
interpretation, it is subject to de novo review.  Fair Hous. 
Rights Ctr. in Se. Pa. v. Post Goldtex GP, LLC, 823 F.3d 209, 
213 (3d Cir. 2016).  For the reasons discussed below, we hold 
that § 1231(a), the post-removal provision, controls.  We will 
then proceed to address Guerrero-Sanchez’s alternative 
argument, that is, whether § 1231(a)(6) implicitly requires that 
he be afforded a bond hearing after prolonged detention.   
A. Legal Framework 
 We begin by examining the text of both provisions.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Thornhill, 759 F.3d 299, 307 (3d Cir. 
2014) (“Statutory interpretation requires that we begin with a 
                                              
foreign country relating to a controlled substance,” id. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  If an alien falls within the ambit of 
§ 1226(c), then no bond hearing is provided and the alien’s 
“detention may end prior to the conclusion of removal 
proceedings ‘only if’ the alien is released for witness-
protection purposes.” Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 847 (quoting 8 




careful reading of the text.” (quoting Zimmerman v. Norfolk S. 
Corp., 706 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2013))).  Section 1226 is the 
pre-removal provision of the INA and “generally governs the 
process of arresting and detaining . . . aliens pending their 
removal.”  Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 837 (2018).  
It provides that “an alien may be arrested and detained pending 
a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the 
United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).  Critical for the purposes 
of this case, an alien detained under § 1226(a) must be afforded 
a bond hearing before an immigration judge to determine if the 
alien’s detention is necessary while he or she awaits 
immigration proceedings.  See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 837 
(“[T]he Attorney General ‘may release’ an alien detained 
under § 1226(a) ‘on bond . . . or conditional parole.’” (quoting 
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a))); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1) (“[T]he 
immigration judge is authorized to exercise the authority . . . to 
detain the alien in custody, release the alien, and determine the 
amount of bond.”).  
 Section 1231(a) is the post-removal detention provision 
of the INA and applies to aliens who are subject to a final order 
of removal.  It provides that “when an alien is ordered 
removed, the Attorney General shall remove the alien from the 
United States within a period of 90 days.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(1)(A).  The provision requires that the alien be 
detained during this 90-day timeframe, see 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(2), which is “referred to as the ‘removal period.’”  
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).  “If the alien does not leave or is not 
removed within the removal period,” then he is normally 
subject to supervised release.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(3).  Section 
1231(a)(6), however, authorizes the continued detention of 
certain classes of aliens “beyond the removal period,” 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(6), for a timeframe “reasonably necessary to bring 
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about that alien’s removal from the United States,”  Zadvydas 
v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001); see also id. at 701 (“[A]n 
alien may be held in confinement until it has been determined 
that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future.”).  The categories of aliens 
covered by § 1231(a)(6) include those who, like Guerrero-
Sanchez, are inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182.3   
 Critically, unlike § 1226(a), the text of § 1231(a)(6) 
does not explicitly authorize a bond hearing.  Therefore, at least 
according to the Government, whether Guerrero-Sanchez is 
entitled to a bond hearing turns on whether § 1226(a) or 
§ 1231(a) authorizes his detention.  We note at the outset that 
this is a question that has divided our sister circuits.  Compare 
Padilla-Ramirez, 882 F.3d 826, 832 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding 
that § 1231(a) governs), with Guerra v. Shanahan, 831 F.3d 
59, 64 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding that § 1226(a) governs). 
B. Chevron Deference 
 As a threshold matter, the Government contends that a 
regulation issued by the Department of Homeland Security, 8 
C.F.R. § 241.8(f), is owed Chevron deference because it 
allegedly provides that § 1231(a) applies to aliens with 
reinstated orders of removal.4  We disagree.  That regulation 
                                              
3 The other classes of aliens covered by § 1231(a)(6) are 
those removable under § 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(C), 1227(a)(2), 
or 1227(a)(4), and those who have “been determined by the 
Attorney General to be a risk to the community or unlikely to 
comply with the order of removal,” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).   
 
4 “Under the familiar two-step Chevron inquiry, first, if 
the statute is clear we must give effect to Congress’ 
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states that “[e]xecution of the reinstated order of removal and 
detention of the alien shall be administered in accordance with” 
Part 241 of the Code of Federal Regulations, which contains 
the regulations implementing 8 U.S.C. § 1231.  8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.8(f).  The relevant provisions of Part 241, however, 
apply to aliens who are subject to reinstated removal orders 
but, unlike Guerrero-Sanchez, have either not expressed a fear 
of removal, or have already been granted withholding but are 
still subject to detention.  See id. §§ 241.3, 241.4(b)(3), 
241.8(f).  Conspicuously absent from these regulations is any 
mention of aliens, who like Guerrero-Sanchez, have reinstated 
removal orders but are still pursuing bona fide withholding-
only relief.  Chevron deference is inapplicable, then, because 
§ 241.8(f) does not resolve the question of whether § 1226(a) 
or § 1231(a) governs Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention.  See 
Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F.3d at 831 (declining to defer 
to 8 C.F.R. § 241.8(f) “because the regulation does not answer 
the question presented”); Guerra, 831 F.3d at 63 (“Chevron 
deference is inapplicable because [Part 241] do[es] not answer 
the question of which provision governs Guerra’s detention.”).  
We must therefore conduct our own scrutiny of the statutory 
provisions. 
 
                                              
unambiguous intent, and, second, if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to a specific issue, we defer to an 
implementing agency’s reasonable interpretation of that 
statute.”  De Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 348 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. 




C. Authorization of Detention 
 To determine whether Guerrero-Sanchez was entitled to 
a bond hearing, we must ascertain the source of authority for 
his detention.  The authorization for an alien’s detention shifts 
from § 1226(a) to § 1231(a)—that is, from the pre-removal 
phase to the post-removal phase—at the point that the alien’s 
order of removal becomes administratively final and removal 
is therefore certain.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).  Thus, 
which provision governs here depends on whether the removal 
order entered against Guerrero-Sanchez is administratively 
final: if it is final, then § 1231(a) applies; otherwise, § 1226(a) 
controls.   
 Crucial to this determination is the fact that Guerrero-
Sanchez’s removal order was reinstated “from its original date 
and is not subject to being reopened or reviewed.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(5).5  Although aliens with reinstated orders of 
                                              
5 Section 1231(a)(5) provides in its entirety:  
 
If the Attorney General finds that 
an alien has reentered the United 
States illegally after having been 
removed or having departed 
voluntarily, under an order of 
removal, the prior order of 
removal is reinstated from its 
original date and is not subject to 
being reopened or reviewed, the 
alien is not eligible and may not 
apply for any relief under this 
chapter, and the alien shall be 
removed under the prior order at 
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removal are “not eligible and may not apply for any relief” 
under Chapter 12 of the INA, id., they may seek withholding-
only remedies, see Cazun v. Attorney Gen. United States, 856 
F.3d 249, 255-56 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[P]recedent and the Attorney 
General’s own interpretation clarify that withholding from 
removal and CAT protection—both forms of relief—are 
actually still available to individuals in reinstatement 
proceedings.” (citing Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 
30, 35 n.4 (2006); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.31(e), 1208.16(c)(4))).  
Accordingly, in order to resolve this case, we must decide 
whether a reinstated order of removal against an alien who, like 
Guerrero-Sanchez, is pursuing bona fide withholding-only 
relief is administratively final.   
 With this framing of the issue in mind, we find that 
§ 1231(a), the post-removal provision, is the more logical 
source of authority for Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention.  A 
removal order is unquestionably final when it is first entered.  
See 8 C.F.R. § 241.1.  When such an order is subsequently 
reinstated, as happened here in Guerrero-Sanchez’s case, “it 
stands to reason that it retains the same administrative finality 
because section 1231(a)(5) proscribes any challenge that might 
affect the status of the underlying removal order.”  Padilla-
Ramirez, 882 F.3d at 831.  Indeed, when a reinstated order of 
removal is in place, withholding-only proceedings do not 
disturb the underlying order of removal; rather, they only 
potentially impede the order’s execution with respect to a 
specific country.  See § 1208.2(c)(3)(i).  If Guerrero-Sanchez 
were to ultimately prevail on either his withholding or CAT 
                                              
any time after the reentry. 
 




claim, the resulting remedy would prohibit only his removal to 
the country of risk: Mexico.  It would not prohibit his removal 
from the United States to an alternative, non-risk country.  See, 
e.g., Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 933 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(stating that a grant of withholding “only prohibits removal of 
the petitioner to the country of risk, but does not prohibit 
removal to a non-risk country” (quoting Castellano-Chacon v. 
INS, 341 F.3d 533, 545 (6th Cir. 2003), holding modified by 
Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 2006))).  
Thus, “[t]he removal order itself . . . is not at issue in the 
withholding-only proceedings, meaning that those proceedings 
cannot diminish or otherwise affect its finality.”  Padilla-
Ramirez, 882 F.3d at 832.  
 Furthermore, the placement of § 1231(a)(5), which 
governs reinstated orders of removal, within the post-removal 
provision itself evidences Congress’s intent that § 1231(a) 
governs the detention of aliens with reinstated orders of 
removal, even when they pursue withholding-only 
proceedings.  See id.; see also, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., 
Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (“Congress’ intent may be 
‘explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly 
contained in its structure’” (quoting Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 
430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977))).  The Ninth Circuit, which held that 
such detentions were authorized by § 1231(a), did so in part on 
this basis.  Padilla-Ramirez, 882 F.3d at 832 (“The fact that the 
reinstatement provision appears among section 1231(a)’s 
detention and supervision provisions further bolsters this 
inference.”). 
 Conversely, we are compelled to find that the plain text 
of the pre-removal provision, § 1226(a), forecloses its 
application to reinstated removal orders.  Critically, for that 
provision to apply there must be a decision “pending” before 
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an immigration judge as to “whether the alien is to be removed 
from the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added).  
No such decision is pending here.  As discussed above, the 
decision that was before the Immigration Judge was not 
whether Guerrero-Sanchez should be removed “from the 
United States”—as is required to trigger § 1226(a)—but rather, 
whether he may be removed to Mexico, i.e., to where he should 
be removed.  “This narrow question of to where an alien may 
be removed is distinct from the broader question of whether the 
alien may be removed; indeed, the former inquiry requires that 
the latter already have been resolved in the affirmative.”  
Padilla-Ramirez, 882 F.3d at 832.  Because Guerrero-
Sanchez’s CAT claim casts no doubt on his removal from the 
United States, it does not implicate § 1226(a).  See id. (“The 
fact that [an alien] may seek further withholding relief if he 
prevails on his present application does not change this 
conclusion since the pending decision in such hypothetical 
proceedings always will be whether he can be removed to a 
particular country, which does not implicate section 
1226(a).”). 
 Accordingly, we hold that a reinstated order of removal 
against an alien who has initiated withholding-only 
proceedings is administratively final.6  Therefore, just as we 
                                              
6 It is worth noting that if § 1226 applied, there would 
be merit to the Government’s argument that § 1226(c) would 
nonetheless—as a statutory matter—prohibit a bond hearing in 
Guerrero-Sanchez’s case.  As discussed supra note 2, 
§ 1226(c) applies to the detention of aliens that have been 
convicted of certain qualifying offenses and does not afford a 
bond hearing unless the alien is released for witness protection 
purposes.  See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 847.  Here, Guerrero-
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Sanchez pled guilty and was convicted under 21 U.S.C. §§ 846 
and 841(a)(1) for conspiracy to distribute more than fifty grams 
of methamphetamine and was sentenced in April 2013 to forty-
two months’ imprisonment.  That offense is a qualifying 
criminal conviction under § 1226(c), which provides that 
“[t]he Attorney General shall take into custody any alien who 
. . . is deportable by reason of having committed any offense 
covered in section 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (A)(iii), (B) . . . of this 
title.”  8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(B).  Relevant for Guerrero-
Sanchez’s case is § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i), which provides: 
 
Any alien who at any time after 
admission has been convicted of a 
violation of (or a conspiracy or 
attempt to violate) any law or 
regulation of a State, the United 
States, or a foreign country 
relating to a controlled substance 
(as defined in section 802 of Title 
21), other than a single offense 
involving possession for one’s 
own use of 30 grams or less of 
marijuana, is deportable.  
 
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  Because Guerrero-Sanchez’s 
conviction related to more than fifty grams of 
methamphetamine, his detention would fall within the confines 
of § 1226(c).  Since he offers no evidence that his release is 
pursuant to a witness protection purpose, he would be 
statutorily foreclosed from being afforded a bond hearing 
altogether if § 1226 applied.  Whether Guerrero-Sanchez 
would be constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing under the 
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elect to follow Padilla-Ramirez, we concurrently decline to 
follow Guerra.  In Guerra, the Second Circuit found that 
§ 1226(a) governs because, although an alien subject to a 
reinstated removal order is clearly removable, the “purpose of 
withholding-only proceedings is to determine precisely 
whether ‘the alien is to be removed from the United States.’”  
831 F.3d at 62 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)).  However, as 
discussed supra, we respectfully disagree with the Second 
Circuit’s interpretation—the purpose of withholding-only 
proceedings is to determine the narrow question of where an 
alien will be removed to, but has no bearing on whether the 
alien will ultimately “be removed from the United States.”  
8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) (emphasis added).  We agree with the Ninth 
Circuit that “[i]n concluding that the ‘purpose of withholding-
only proceedings is to determine precisely whether the alien is 
to be removed from the United States,’ the [Second Circuit] did 
not paint with a fine enough brush.”  Padilla-Ramirez, 882 
F.3d at 835 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting Guerra, 831 F.3d at 62).  
 Guerra also reasoned that the reinstated removal order 
was not final because an alien could appeal a denial of a 
withholding application to a federal court of appeals.  831 F.3d 
at 63.  On the basis that the conception of finality pertaining to 
judicial review must be the same as that which pertains to the 
                                              
Due Process Clause is an entirely different question—a 
question that we need not resolve today because we hold that 
his detention is governed by § 1231(a).  See Jennings, 138 S. 
Ct. at 847 (declining to decide whether the Due Process Clause 
requires a pre-removal bond hearing because the Supreme 
Court is “a court of review, not of first view” (quoting Cutter 




administrative finality of his removal order for detention 
purposes, the Second Circuit reasoned that a “bifurcated 
definition of finality” would “run[] counter to principles of 
administrative law which counsel that to be final, an agency 
action must ‘mark the consummation of the agency’s 
decisionmaking process.’”  Id. (quoting U.S. Army Corps of 
Eng’rs v. Hawkes Co., 136 S.Ct. 1807, 1813 (2016)).  
However, we disagree—as the Ninth Circuit aptly explained, 
the application of § 1231(a) here does not vitiate the 
administrative legal principles that the Second Circuit relies 
on:  
The Second Circuit is correct that only an agency 
action marking “the consummation of the 
agency’s decisionmaking process” qualifies as 
final agency action.  But its conclusion that no 
such consummation exists while withholding-
only proceedings are ongoing again 
misunderstands the decision at stake in those 
proceedings. The agency already decided that 
Padilla–Ramirez “is to be removed from the 
United States,” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and a 
different, more limited decision is now pending 
in his withholding-only proceedings—namely, 
whether he may be removed to El Salvador. The 
agency has consummated its decision-making 
regarding the first issue, but not the second. It 
therefore is consonant with settled administrative 
legal principles to hold that Padilla–Ramirez’s 
reinstated removal order (i.e., the agency’s 
decision that he “is to be removed from the 
United States,” id.) is final for detention 
purposes even though it lacks finality for 
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purposes of judicial review of his withholding-
only claim.   
Padilla-Ramirez, 882 F.3d at 836 (citations omitted); see also 
Ponta-Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 557 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(“[A]liens subject to reinstatement have already been ordered 
removed, and thus have already been provided with the 
requisite procedures and review.”). 
 In a similar vein, amici the American Immigration 
Council and the American Immigration Lawyers Association 
(collectively “AIC”) contend that “[e]very circuit to have 
addressed the question [of finality] has agreed that a 
reinstatement order where the individual has articulated a fear 
of return is not final until reasonable fear or the withholding-
only proceedings have been concluded.”  AIC Br. at 17-18 
(citing Ponce-Osorio v. Johnson, 824 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2016); 
Jimenez-Morales v. Att’y Gen., 821 F.3d 1307 (11th Cir. 2016), 
cert. denied sub nom. Jimenez-Morales v. Lynch, 137 S.Ct. 685 
(2017); Luna-Garcia v. Holder, 777 F.3d 1182, 1183 (10th Cir. 
2015); Ortiz-Alfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955 (9th Cir. 2012)).  
However, none of these cases address the finality of reinstated 
deportation orders for the purposes of removal.  Rather, they 
address whether such orders are final “for the purposes of 
timely petitioning for judicial review” of orders denying relief 
in a reasonable fear or withholding-only proceeding.  See, e.g., 
Ortiz-Alfaro, 694 F.3d at 958 (noting that validity of “the 
underlying prior removal order” was not before the court).7  
                                              
7 See also Ponce-Osorio, 824 F.3d at 507 (“The 
reinstatement order is thus non-final, and we lack jurisdiction 
over Ponce-Osorio’s petition for review.”); Luna-Garcia, 777 
F.3d at 1185 (describing the issue as determining “the point at 
which a reinstated removal order becomes final for purposes of 
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These cases are therefore inapposite.  AIC relies on the 
incorrect assumption that “the finality of a reinstatement order 
is identical for purposes of judicial review and detention.”  AIC 
Br. at 20.  Indeed, it is telling that neither Padilla-Ramirez nor 
Guerra—both of which were decided after Ponce-Osorio, 
Jimenez-Morales, Luna-Garcia, and Ortiz-Alfaro—rely on 
any of these cases for support; to the contrary, they distinguish 
them.8   
                                              
calculating the time to petition for review”); Jimenez-Morales, 
821 F.3d at 1308 (“DHS’ reinstatement of the 2011 order of 
removal was not final because the reasonable fear proceeding 
was ongoing.  That presents a jurisdictional problem because 
the Immigration and Nationality Act vests circuit courts with 
jurisdiction to review only ‘final’ orders of removal.”).   
 
8 In Guerra, when discussing that the court was deciding 
an issue of first impression, it stated “[t]he Ninth and Tenth 
Circuits have held that they lack jurisdiction over petitions for 
review filed while withholding-only proceedings are ongoing” 
but that “[n]either court, however, answered the question of 
which section authorized detention for aliens in Guerra’s 
position.”  831 F.3d at 62 n.1 (citing Ortiz-Alfaro, 694 F.3d at 
958; Luna-Garcia, 777 F.3d at 1184).  
 
In Padilla-Ramirez, the Ninth Circuit held that Ortiz-
Alfaro “is readily distinguishable because its holding rested on 
the canon of constitutional avoidance.”  882 F.3d at 833.  
Conversely, “[h]olding that Padilla-Ramirez’s reinstated order 
is administratively final for detention purposes poses no such 
constitutional difficulty, so the avoidance canon need not 
dictate the outcome here.”  Id.  Thus, “Ortiz-Alfaro . . . does 
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 To summarize, Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention is 
governed by § 1231(a).  A reinstated removal order is 
administratively final for the purposes of removal because it 
provides that an alien “shall be removed” from the United 
States, and that determination is “not subject to being reopened 
or reviewed.”  8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(5).  An alien with a 
reinstated order of removal therefore cannot have a decision 
“pending” before an immigration judge on “whether the alien 
is to be removed from the United States.”  8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) 
(emphasis added).  As a result, such aliens cannot fulfill the 
necessary predicate to implicate § 1226(a), and they cannot 
rely on that provision to obtain a bond hearing.  
III. THE IMPLICIT BOND HEARING REQUIREMENT 
OF § 1231(a)(6) 
 Because § 1231(a) governs Guerrero-Sanchez’s 
detention, we must next reach his alternative argument that he 
is still entitled to a bond hearing because that provision 
implicitly requires a bond hearing after prolonged detention.  
                                              
not control the outcome of this case.”  Id. at 834.  Notably, 
Guerrero-Sanchez relies on Ortiz-Alfaro for the proposition 
that a holding that the reinstated removal order is final would 
make it impossible for him to timely petition for review of an 
immigration judge’s decision denying him relief.  However, 
this portion of his case does not invoke the canon of 
constitutional avoidance because “the text and structure of the 
[INA] indicate that Congress intended for section 1231(a) to 
govern detention of aliens subject to reinstated removal 
orders.”  Padilla-Ramirez, 882 F.3d at 834.  Ortiz-Alfaro is 




For the reasons below, we agree and will affirm the District 
Court’s order on this basis.   
A. Zadvydas v. Davis 
 As discussed supra, when an alien has been found to be 
unlawfully present in the United States and a final order of 
removal has been entered, the Government ordinarily secures 
the alien’s removal during a subsequent 90-day statutory 
“removal period,” during which time the alien normally is held 
in custody.  8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A).  However, since 
Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention lasted longer than 90 days, it 
was governed by § 1231(a)(6), which authorizes detention 
beyond the 90 days under certain circumstances.  It provides:  
An alien ordered removed [1] who is 
inadmissible . . . [2] [or] removable [as a result 
of violations of status requirements or entry 
conditions, violations of criminal law, or reasons 
of security or foreign policy] or [3] who has been 
determined by the Attorney General to be a risk 
to the community or unlikely to comply with the 
order of removal, may be detained beyond the 
removal period and, if released, shall be subject 
to [certain] terms of supervision . . . . 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6).  Noticeably, unlike § 1226(a), the text 
of § 1231(a)(6) does not explicitly authorize a bond hearing for 
aliens that are encompassed within its ambit.  Nor does 
§ 1231(a)(6) contain any express limit on the duration of an 
alien’s detention under the provision.   
 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), however, 
the Supreme Court interpreted § 1231(a)(6) to authorize the 
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detention of aliens “only as long as ‘reasonably necessary’ to 
remove them from the country.”  Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 
371, 377 (2005) (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689, 699).  
Such an interpretation was required to avoid the “‘serious 
constitutional threat’ . . . posed by the indefinite detention of 
aliens who had been admitted to the country.”  Id. (quoting 
Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699).  According to the Court, the 
provision’s use of the word “may” was ambiguous because it 
“‘suggests discretion,’ but ‘not necessarily . . . unlimited 
discretion.”  Id. (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699).  Here, the 
Government argues that Zadvydas resolves the only ambiguity 
in the text of § 1231(a)(6) and makes clear that Guerrero-
Sanchez “may be held in confinement until it has been 
determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal in 
the reasonably foreseeable future.”  Appellant Br. at 15 
(quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701).     
 We disagree.  Zadvydas had no occasion to address the 
due process concerns posed by prolonged detention of 
someone in Guerrero-Sanchez’s situation who is still seeking 
withholding-only relief.  Rather, Zadvydas addressed only the 
detention of noncitizens who—unlike Guerrero-Sanchez—
have exhausted all administrative and judicial challenges to 
removal, including applications for relief from removal, and 
are only waiting for their removal to be effectuated.  See 
Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527 (2003) (distinguishing 
Zadvydas on the basis that “in Zadvydas, the aliens challenging 
their detention following final orders of deportation were ones 
for whom removal was ‘no longer practically attainable’” 
(quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690)).   
 This distinction is material because detaining Guerrero-
Sanchez without a bond hearing while he pursues his bona fide 
withholding-only claim “would effectively punish [him] for 
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pursuing applicable legal remedies.”9  Leslie v. Attorney Gen. 
of U.S., 678 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), abrogated in part and on other grounds by 
Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 847.  Thus, Zadvydas’ focus on the 
foreseeability of removal—and its limiting construction of 
§ 1231(a)(6) as authorizing detention only when removal is 
reasonably foreseeable—does not address or settle the due 
process concerns raised by the prolonged detention of an alien 
like Guerrero-Sanchez, who is still pursuing a bona fide 
withholding-only claim that could take years to resolve.   
 More importantly, Zadvydas narrowed the scope of the 
detention that § 1231(a)(6) authorizes.  See Hernandez-
Carrera v. Carlson, 547 F.3d 1237, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(“The Supreme Court [in Zadvydas], confronted with a very 
broad statute, narrowed its scope to avoid unconstitutionality” 
(quoting Thai v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 967, 971 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of en banc))).  It did not, 
however, provide that the Court’s limiting construction of 
§ 1231(a)(6) is the sole constraint on detention that the Due 
                                              
9 The Government contends that Guerrero-Sanchez’s 
confinement is not “‘punishment’ for pursuing withholding or 
deferral of removal to Mexico” because such detention is 
“nonpunitive in purpose and effect.” Government Reply Br. at 
18 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).  However, “the reality 
[is] that merely calling a confinement ‘civil detention’ does 
not, of itself, meaningfully differentiate it from penal 
measures.”  Chavez-Alvarez v. Warden York Cty. Prison, 783 
F.3d 469, 478 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 
U.S. 346, 361 (1997); Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 27 




Process Clause requires.10   See id. at 1249 (“In Zadvydas, the 
Supreme Court did not purport to ‘resolve’ the statutory 
ambiguity in § 1231(a)(6) once and for all. . . . In no way, . . . 
did the Court signal that its interpretation was the only 
reasonable construction of § 1231(a)(6).”); id. at 1248 (“[T]he 
Court’s method of narrowing [§ 1231(a)(6) in Zadvydas] is not 
the only permissible one.” (quoting Thai, 389 F.3d at 971 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of en banc))).  Indeed, a 
detention could still raise constitutional concerns even if it is 
ostensibly authorized by statute.  See Diouf v. Napolitano, 634 
F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2011) (invoking canon of 
constitutional avoidance to interpret § 1231(a)(6) after 
determining “that [the alien’s] detention was authorized by 
statute”); Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1065 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (“Even if [an alien’s] continued detention is 
permitted by statute, however, due process requires ‘adequate 
procedural protections’ to ensure that the government’s 
asserted justification for physical confinement ‘outweighs the 
individual’s constitutionally protected interest in avoiding 
physical restraint.’” (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690-91)).  
While Zadvydas limited the substantive scope of § 1231(a)(6), 
                                              
10 To the contrary, Zadvydas provides that, even where 
detention is not indefinite, it still must bear a “reasonable 
relation” to the Government’s interests in preventing flight and 
danger to the community and be accompanied by adequate 
procedures to determine if detention is necessary. 533 U.S. at 
690 (quoting Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972)); 
see also id. at 700 (“[I]f removal is reasonably foreseeable, the 
habeas court should consider the risk of the alien’s committing 
further crimes as a factor potentially justifying confinement 




it did not explicitly preclude courts from construing 
§ 1231(a)(6) to include additional procedural protections 
during the statutorily authorized detention period, should those 
protections be necessary to avoid detention that could raise 
different constitutional concerns.  See Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1084 
(holding that “individuals detained under § 1231(a)(6) are 
entitled to the same procedural safeguards against prolonged 
detention as individuals detained under § 1226(a)”). 
B. The Due Process Concerns Associated with Guerrero-
Sanchez’s Detention 
 Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention without bond—which 
had spanned 637 days before his hearing—pending the 
resolution of his withholding-only proceedings raises serious 
due process concerns.  See Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1086 
(“[P]rolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6), without adequate 
procedural protections, would raise ‘serious constitutional 
concerns.’” (quoting Casas-Castrillon v. Dep’t of Homeland 
Sec., 535 F.3d 942, 950 (9th Cir. 2008)); Chavez-Alvarez v. 
Warden York Cty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 471 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(“The total number of days that Chavez–Alvarez has been held 
in civil detention since his arrest, of itself, gives us reason for 
pause.”), abrogated in part and on other grounds by Jennings, 
138 S. Ct. at 847.   
 We have already recognized in the pre-removal context 
that “when detention becomes unreasonable, the Due Process 
Clause demands a hearing, at which the Government bears the 
burden of proving that continued detention is necessary to 
fulfill the purposes of the detention statute.”  Diop v. 
ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d 221, 233 (3d Cir. 2011), 
abrogated in part and on other grounds by Jennings, 138 S. 
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Ct. at 847.11  In those cases, “due process requires us to 
recognize that, at a certain point—which may differ case 
                                              
11 In Diop, applying the canon of constitutional 
avoidance, we construed § 1226(c) to contain an implicit 
“reasonable” time limit on the period for which detention 
without a bond hearing was statutorily authorized.  656 F.3d at 
231.  This statutory holding has been abrogated by Jennings, 
where the Court held that the text of § 1226(c) is clear and that 
“detention [under § 1226(c)] may end prior to the conclusion 
of removal proceedings ‘only if’ the alien is released for 
witness-protection purposes.” Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 847 
(quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)).   
 
Diop, however, also reached a constitutional holding 
and found that “when detention becomes unreasonable, the 
Due Process Clause demands a hearing, at which the 
Government bears the burden of proving that continued 
detention is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the detention 
statute.”  656 F.3d at 233 (emphasis added); see also id. at 223 
(“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution requires that the Government establish that 
continued detention is necessary to further the purposes of  
[§ 1226(c)].”); id. at 235 (holding that Diop’s detention 
constituted “a violation of the Due Process Clause”).  We 
reasoned, inter alia, that “[t]he constitutionality of [mandatory 
detention] is a function of the length of the detention” and that 
“[a]t a certain point, continued detention . . . becomes 
unconstitutional unless the Government has justified its actions 
at a hearing inquiring into whether continued detention is 
consistent with the law’s purpose of preventing flight and 
dangers to the community.”  Id. at 232 (emphasis added).  
Since we hold that Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention is governed 
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by case—the burden to an alien’s liberty outweighs a mere 
presumption that the alien will flee and/or is dangerous.” 
Chavez-Alvarez, 783 F.3d at 474–75 (footnote omitted); see 
also Diop, 656 F.3d at 232 (“At a certain point, continued 
detention becomes . . . unconstitutional unless the Government 
has justified its actions at a hearing inquiring into whether 
continued detention is consistent with the law’s purposes of 
preventing flight and dangers to the community.”).   
                                              
by § 1231(a)(6) and not § 1226(c), we have no occasion to 
determine here whether Diop’s constitutional holding survives 
Jennings.  
 
However, the constitutional concerns that Diop 
identified with mandatory detention in the pre-removal context 
are similar to those in the post-removal context.  See Diouf, 634 
F.3d at 1087 (“Regardless of the stage of the proceedings, the 
same important interest is at stake—freedom from prolonged 
detention.”).  And we need not determine that those concerns 
rise to the level of an outright constitutional violation in order 
to employ the canon of constitutional avoidance.  Indeed, the 
entire purpose of the canon is to avoid reaching the merits of 
the constitutional issue.  See, e.g., Santana Prod., Inc. v. 
Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 401 F.3d 123, 130–31 (3d Cir. 
2005) (“[I]t is well established that courts have a duty to avoid 
passing upon a constitutional question if the case may be 
disposed of on some other ground.” (quoting Spicer v. Hilton, 
618 F.2d 232, 239 (3d Cir. 1980))).  Accordingly, because we 
conclude that—unlike § 1226(c)—§ 1231(a)(6) is ambiguous, 
we will interpret the provision in a manner that does not raise 
the constitutional concerns that Diop identified.   
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 We see no substantial distinction between the liberty 
interests of aliens detained under § 1226(a) and § 1231(a)(6) 
because “[r]egardless of the stage of the proceedings, the same 
important interest is at stake—freedom from prolonged 
detention”—accordingly, “[t]he liberty interests of persons 
detained under § 1231(a)(6) are comparable to those of persons 
detained under § 1226(a).”  Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1087.  The 
Government contends that individuals like Guerrero-Sanchez 
have a lesser liberty interest because they each have a prior 
removal order already in place.  However, Guerrero-Sanchez’s 
status is not appreciably different from that of the alien in Diop, 
who had a final removal order at the time we decided his case 
and was subjected to prolonged detention while pursuing—
precisely like Guerrero-Sanchez—CAT relief, as well as 
withholding of removal.  See 656 F.3d at 226 (explaining that 
the alien in Diop argued before the Immigration Court “that the 
vacatur of his conviction meant that he was eligible for 
withholding of removal” and that he made a “claim of a right 
to relief under the Convention Against Torture”).     
 As to the Government’s interest in detaining aliens in 
the post-removal context, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that 
“[t]he distinctions between § 1226(a) and § 1231(a)(6) . . . are 
not substantial enough to justify denying a bond hearing to all 
aliens subject to extended detention under § 1231(a)(6).”  
Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1087.  As the Ninth Circuit aptly explained:  
First, the government has an interest in ensuring 
that aliens are available for removal if their legal 
challenges do not succeed whether they are 
detained under § 1226(a) or § 1231(a)(6). 
Second, in either circumstance, the 
government’s interest in the prompt removal of 
aliens who have exhausted their legal challenges 
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is served by the bond hearing process itself. If the 
alien poses a flight risk, [continued] detention is 
permitted. 
Third, the same concerns about prolonged 
detention arise irrespective of whether an alien 
has petitioned for review of an order of removal 
(direct review) or an order denying a motion to 
reopen (collateral review). In both situations, it 
may take years for the petitions for review to be 
resolved. 
Id. at 1087-88.  We therefore find that it may be the case that 
the Due Process Clause prohibits prolonged detention under 
§ 1231(a)(6) without a bond hearing.   
A. Canon of Constitutional Avoidance and Our 
Construction of § 1231(a)(6) 
 Despite the constitutional concerns raised by Guerrero-
Sanchez’s detention under § 1231(a)(6), we decline to decide 
whether his continued confinement violated the Due Process 
Clause.  “As a first inquiry, we must avoid deciding a 
constitutional question if the case may be disposed of on some 
other basis.”  Doe v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 513 F.3d 95, 
102 (3d Cir. 2008).  We assume that Congress does not intend 
to pass unconstitutional laws—accordingly, “it is a cardinal 
principle of statutory interpretation . . . that when an Act of 
Congress raises a serious doubt as to its constitutionality, . . . 
[courts] will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute 
is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.”  
Diop, 656 F.3d at 231 (quoting Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 689).  
We therefore invoke the canon of constitutional avoidance so 
long as “the statute is found to be susceptible of more than one 
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construction.”  Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 842 (quoting Clark, 543 
U.S. at 385).    
 The Supreme Court has already determined that the text 
of § 1231(a)(6) is ambiguous as to the due process protections 
that it provides.  See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 697 (holding that 
§ 1231(a)(6) is ambiguous).  This is the case because 
§ 1231(a)(6), unlike other provisions in the INA, does not 
provide for detention for a specified period of time, uses the 
word “may” to describe the detention authority rather than 
“shall,” and lacks an express exception to detention provided 
for in the provision.  See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 844.  The plain 
text of § 1231(a)(6) therefore invites us to apply the canon of 
constitutional avoidance in order to avoid the question of 
whether Guerrero-Sanchez’s continued detention under that 
provision violates the Due Process Clause.  See Demore, 538 
U.S. at 523 (“It is well established that the Fifth Amendment 
entitles aliens to due process of law in deportation 
proceedings.” (quoting Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 306 
(1993)). 
 In order to avoid determining whether Guerrero-
Sanchez’s detention violates the Due Process Clause, we adopt 
the Ninth Circuit’s limiting construction of § 1231(a)(6) that 
“an alien facing prolonged detention under [that provision] is 
entitled to a bond hearing before an immigration judge and is 
entitled to be released from detention unless the government 
establishes that the alien poses a risk of flight or a danger to the 
community.”12  Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1092.  Critically, our 
                                              
12 The Government must meet its burden in such bond 
hearings by clear and convincing evidence.  See Singh v. 
Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203-04 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because it 
is improper to ask the [alien] to ‘share equally with society the 
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holding today necessarily applies to all aliens detained under 
§ 1231(a)(6), not just those, like Guerrero-Sanchez, who have 
reinstated removal orders under § 1231(a)(5) and are pursuing 
withholding-only relief.  This is because “statutory language 
given a limiting construction in one context must be interpreted 
consistently in other contexts, ‘even though other of the 
statute’s applications, standing alone, would not support the 
same limitation.’”  Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 
U.S. 119, 140 (2005) (quoting Clark, 543 U.S. at 380).   
 Here, there is no basis in § 1231(a)(6) to fashion a class 
of aliens that is not explicitly enumerated in the provision—if 
we were to hold that only aliens like Guerrero-Sanchez were 
entitled to bond hearings, then we would be acknowledging 
and distinguishing a specific class of aliens that is not 
ostensibly recognized anywhere in the text or legislative 
history of the INA.  See Clark, 543 U.S. at 378 (“To give [the 
words ‘may be detained beyond the removal period,’ in 
§ 1231(a)(6)] a different meaning for each category [of aliens] 
would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one.”).  Such 
a reading of § 1231(a)(6) would be implausible, and would 
therefore constitute an inappropriate application of the canon 
                                              
risk of error when the possible injury to the individual’—
deprivation of liberty—is so significant, a clear and convincing 
evidence standard of proof provides the appropriate level of 
procedural protection.” (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 
418, 427 (1979))); Lora v. Shanahan, 804 F.3d 601, 616 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (“[W]e also hold that the detainee must be admitted 
to bail unless the government establishes by clear and 
convincing evidence that the immigrant poses a risk of flight 
or a risk of danger to the community.”), cert. granted, 




of constitutional avoidance.  See Jennings, 138 S. Ct. at 843 
(“Spotting a constitutional issue does not give a court the 
authority to rewrite a statute as it pleases. Instead, the canon 
permits a court to ‘choos[e] between competing plausible 
interpretations of a statutory text.’” (quoting Clark, 543 U.S. at 
381)).  Accordingly, our interpretation applies to all classes of 
aliens that are enumerated in § 1231(a)(6)—i.e., aliens who are 
inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182, removable under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(1)(C), (a)(2), or (a)(4), or who have “been 
determined by the Attorney General to be a risk to the 
community or unlikely to comply with the order of removal,” 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)—because “[t]he operative language of 
§ 1231(a)(6), ‘may be detained beyond the removal period,’ 
applies without differentiation to all three categories of aliens 
that are its subject.”  Clark, 543 U.S. at 378 (quoting 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1231(a)(6)). 
 We emphasize, however, that aliens detained under 
§ 1231(a)(6) are only entitled to a bond hearing after prolonged 
detention.13  We therefore must determine when a detention 
becomes prolonged.  In order to identify “the specific dictates 
                                              
13 Put differently, our decision today does not hold that 
Congress intended for § 1231(a)(6) to contain an immediate 
bond hearing at the instant that an alien’s removal order 
becomes final.  See Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1091 (“Our focus here . 
. . is on prolonged detention.”).  Furthermore, we emphasize 
that aliens are not necessarily entitled to release after 
prolonged detention.  Rather, they are owed only a bond 
hearing before an immigration judge to determine if they pose 
either a flight risk or a danger to the community.  An alien will 
be released only if the immigration judge answers both 
inquiries in the negative. 
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of due process” in this context, we apply the three-part test that 
the Supreme Court enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 355 (1976).   That test provides that we weigh three 
factors:   
First, the private interest that will be affected by 
the official action; second, the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of such interest through 
the procedures used, and the probable value, if 
any, of additional or substitute procedural 
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the 
fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirement 
would entail.    
Id.  Under § 1231(a)(6), “[w]hen detention crosses the six-
month threshold and release or removal is not imminent, the 
private interests at stake are profound” and “the risk of an 
erroneous deprivation of liberty in the absence of a hearing 
before a neutral decisionmaker is substantial.”  Diouf, 634 F.3d 
at 1091-92; id. at 1092 n.13 (“As a general matter, detention is 
prolonged [under § 1231(a)(6)] when it has lasted six months 
and is expected to continue more than minimally beyond six 
months.”).  This is because “the constitutional case for 
continued detention without inquiry into its necessity becomes 
more and more suspect as detention continues . . . .” Diop, 656 
F.3d at 234; see also Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701 (providing that 
due process analysis is altered as “the period of . . . 
confinement grows”).   
 Correspondingly, the fiscal and administrative burden 
on the Government of requiring a bond hearing before an 
immigration judge is diminished in light of our estimation that 
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the incidence of these hearings will be manageable since the 
vast majority of removal orders are executed well before six 
months.14  As such, “[t]he burden imposed on the 
[G]overnment by requiring hearings before an immigration 
judge at [the post-removal] stage of the proceedings is . . . a 
reasonable one.”  Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1092.  Indeed, in 
Zadvydas, the Supreme Court, while interpreting § 1231(a)(6) 
in a related context, adopted a presumption that aliens could be 
reasonably detained without a hearing for six months because 
there is “reason to believe . . . that Congress previously 
doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six 
months.”  533 U.S. 678, 701 (citing Juris. Statement in United 
States v. Witkovich, O.T.1956, No. 295, pp. 8-9).  We therefore 
adopt a six-month rule here—that is, an alien detained under 
                                              
14 See, e.g., United States v. Castro-Verdugo, 750 F.3d 
1065, 1074 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]he median time spent by 
defendants in immigration custody prior to a removal in Fall of 
2012 (including people who did not concede removability) was 
10 days, with 40 percent of aliens spending three days or less 
in immigration detention prior to their removal.” (citing Legal 
Noncitizens Receive Longest ICE Detention, Transactional 
Records Access Clearinghouse (June 3, 2013), Table 3: 
Statistics on Detention Time by Detailed “Book-out” Reason, 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/321/ (finding that, in 
November and December 2012, ninety-eight percent of 
detainees were removed within six-months after removal order 
was entered, and that post-removal median detention length 





§ 1231(a)(6) is generally entitled to a bond hearing after six 
months (i.e., 180 days) of custody.15   
B. Chevron Deference 
 In interpreting § 1231(a)(6) to avoid the serious due 
process concerns identified above, we recognize that we are 
declining to defer to relevant DHS regulations.  When a statute 
is ambiguous, we “normally apply Chevron deference to the 
agency’s interpretation of the statute, so long as that 
construction was reasonable.”  Romanishyn v. Attorney Gen. of 
U.S., 455 F.3d 175, 183 (3d Cir. 2006).  However, although we 
consider the canon of constitutional avoidance to “defin[e] the 
scope of a congressional delegation in light of an agency’s 
actual interpretation,” Am. Farm Bureau Fed’n v. U.S. E.P.A., 
792 F.3d 281, 301 (3d Cir. 2015), we do not defer to an 
agency’s interpretation of a statute that raise serious 
constitutional doubts.  See Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 
                                              
15 However, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that “[i]f 
the 180-day threshold has been crossed, but the alien’s release 
or removal is imminent . . . [then] the government [is not] 
required to afford the alien a [bond] hearing before an 
immigration judge.”  Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1092 n.13.  We do so 
to ensure the uniform and national administration of bond 
hearings pursuant to § 1231(a)(6).  See, e.g., Kahn v. INS, 36 
F.3d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994) (“The INA ‘was designed to 
implement a uniform federal policy,’ and the meaning of 
concepts important to its application . . . ‘require[ ] a uniform 
federal definition.’” (quoting Rosario v. INS, 962 F.3d 1412, 
1414 (9th Cir. 1994))).  We emphasize that this exception is 
narrow, and that it applies only in instances where detention 
“is expected to continue more than minimally beyond six 
months.”  Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1092 n.13. 
39 
 
923 (1995) (“[W]e think it inappropriate for a court engaged in 
constitutional scrutiny to accord deference to [an agency’s] 
interpretation of [a statute].”); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 
207 (1991) (“It is thus implausible that, after Chevron, agency 
interpretations of ambiguous statutes will prevail even if the 
consequence of those interpretations is to . . . raise 
serious constitutional doubts” (quoting Cass R. Sunstein, Law 
and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM L. REV. 2071, 
2113 (1990))); Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cty. v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 173-74 (2001) (refusing 
to apply Chevron deference where “significant constitutional 
questions [are] raised”); Hernandez-Carrera, 547 F.3d at 1249 
(“It is well established that the canon of constitutional 
avoidance does constrain an agency’s discretion to interpret 
statutory ambiguities, even when Chevron deference would 
otherwise be due.”); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Kempthorne, 512 
F.3d 702, 711 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (“This canon of constitutional 
avoidance trumps Chevron deference, and we will not submit 
to an agency’s interpretation of a statute if it ‘presents serious 
constitutional difficulties.’” (quoting Chamber of Commerce v. 
FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 605 (D.C. Cir. 1995)) (citation omitted)); 
Kim Ho Ma v. Ashcroft, 257 F.3d 1095, 1105 n.15 (9th Cir. 
2001) (“Chevron principles are not applicable where a 
substantial constitutional question is raised by an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute it is authorized to construe.” (citation 
omitted)).   
 Such is the case here.  The DHS regulations that 
implement the Government’s detention authority under 
§ 1231(a)(6) themselves “raise serious constitutional 
concerns.”  Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1091.  These regulations—
8 C.F.R. §§ 241.4 and 241.13—provide administrative custody 
reviews after 90 days, 180 days, and 18 months, see 8 C.F.R. 
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§ 241.4(k)(2)(ii)-(iii), by DHS employees who are not 
ostensibly neutral decision makers such as immigration judges.  
Importantly, the regulations also place the burden on the alien, 
rather than the Government, to prove that he or she is not a 
flight risk or a danger to the society, see 8 C.F.R. § 241.4(d)(1), 
and “there is no appeal from [DHS’s] . . . decision.”  8 C.F.R. 
§ 241.4(d); see also 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g)(2).16 
 This procedure fails to account for the Supreme Court’s 
admonition that “the Constitution may well preclude granting 
‘an administrative body the unreviewable authority to make 
determinations implicating fundamental rights.’”  Zadvydas, 
533 U.S. at 692 (quoting Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. at 
Walpole v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 450 (1985)).  We therefore 
decline to apply Chevron deference to the Government’s 
interpretation of § 1231(a)(6).  See Diouf, 634 F.3d at 1091 
(declining to defer to DHS regulations that implement post-
removal detention).      
IV. CONCLUSION 
 As we have discussed throughout our decision, our 
holding today is in line with that of the Ninth Circuit, the sole 
                                              
16 In the narrow circumstances that an alien is 
determined to have “no significant likelihood of removal in the 
reasonably foreseeable future,” 8 C.F.R. § 241.14(a)(1), and if 
ICE determines that he or she is “specially dangerous,” then it 
refers that ruling to an immigration judge for review, who must 
conduct a “reasonable cause hearing” before making a merits 
determination, id. § 241.14(g).  The immigration judge’s 
determination on the merits may be appealed by either party to 




court of appeals to have also addressed this issue.  See Diouf, 
634 F.3d at 1082.  Diouf is not controlling on us, yet it is 
instructive.   We are also “reluctant to create [a] circuit split[],” 
and only do so “where a ‘compelling basis exists.’” Parker v. 
Montgomery Cty. Corr. Facility/Bus. Office Manager, 870 
F.3d 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Karlo v. Pittsburgh 
Glass Works, LLC, 849 F.3d 61, 75 n.7 (3d Cir. 2017)).  This 
reluctance is especially acute “where the rules at issue ‘are best 
applied uniformly.’”  Padilla-Ramirez, 882 F.3d at 836 
(quoting Kelton Arms Condo. Owners Ass’n, Inc. v. Homestead 
Ins. Co., 346 F.3d 1190, 1192 (9th Cir. 2003)).  Here, the INA 
“certainly falls into this category” because it is “a 
comprehensive federal scheme that requires a nationally 
unified administration program.”  Id.; see also Arizona v. 
United States, 567 U.S. 387, 401 (2012) (describing federal 
immigration law as “a comprehensive and unified system”).  
Our decision today aligns this Court’s law with that of our 
sister circuit, and therefore effectuates Congress’s directive 
that “the immigration laws of the United States should be 
enforced vigorously and uniformly.”  Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986, Pub.L. 99-603, § 115, 100 Stat. 3384 
(emphasis added). 
 Here, Guerrero-Sanchez was detained by ICE from May 
2015 to February 2017, and he was provided a bond hearing 
only after 637 days in civil detention.  Pursuant to our limiting 
construction of § 1231(a)(6), he was owed a hearing because 
he was detained well beyond six months.  According to the 
Government, Guerrero-Sanchez should not have received a 
bond hearing at any point before his withholding-only 
proceeding takes place, which is not scheduled until September 
5, 2019.  The Government contends that it may detain 
Guerrero-Sanchez under § 1231(a)(6) for, at a minimum, fifty-
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three months without inquiry into the necessity of his 
detention.  For all of the reasons discussed supra, we find to 
the contrary and hold that Guerrero-Sanchez’s detention was 
unquestionably prolonged.  We will therefore affirm on 
alternative grounds the District Court’s decision to afford 
Guerrero-Sanchez a bond hearing.17 
                                              
17 Because we conclude that a bond hearing was 
statutorily required, and the Government withdrew its appeal 
of the District Court’s determination at the bond hearing to 
release Guerrero-Sanchez subject to certain conditions, the 
District Court’s order pertaining to Guerrero-Sanchez’s release 
will be left undisturbed.   
Rafael Ignacio Guerrero-Sanchez 
Nos.  16-4134 and 17-1390 
          
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
I concur in the majority’s reasoning and result but 
believe that neither 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) nor § 1231(a) clearly 
addresses the detention of one whose removal order has been 
reinstated but who has filed for withholding of removal. The 
majority chooses to apply § 1231(a)(6) because, given the 
finality of a reinstated removal order, a decision as to whether 
Guerrero-Sanchez is to be removed from the United States is 
not “pending.” While § 1226(a) may be intended to apply 
before a removal order is entered, the provision for bond 
hearings under § 1226(a) may be better suited to the instant 
situation, since withholding proceedings are protracted, and 
can remain pending for years. Two other Courts of Appeals 
have considered this issue, each reasoning thoughtfully to a 
different conclusion.1 Thus, I submit that legislative 
                                              
1 In Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F.3d 826 (9th Cir. 2017), 
the court found a reinstated removal order to be 
administratively final for the purpose of detention, despite the 
detainee’s ongoing withholding proceedings, and thus found 
detention to be appropriate under § 1231(a). In Guerra v. 
Shanahan, 831 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2016), the court reasoned that 
proceedings were not administratively final until the 
detainee’s withholding proceedings had been adjudicated, and 
thus found § 1226(a) to apply. 
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clarification is needed in order to addresses the specific 
detention issue before us.2  
 
Section 1231(a) anticipates that removal is certain, yet 
Guerrero-Sanchez’s reinstated removal order is not 
administratively final, as his withholding proceedings are 
ongoing. C.f. Majority Opinion at 17. Indeed, nearly every 
Court of Appeals to have considered the issue of finality of a 
reinstated removal order has held that there is no 
administrative finality until the agency has adjudicated the 
request for withholding of removal. See Guerra v. Shanahan, 
831 F.3d 59, 63–64 (2d Cir. 2016); Jimenez-Morales v. Att’y 
Gen., 821 F.3d 1307, 1308 (11th Cir. 2016), cert. denied sub 
nom. Jimenez-Morales v. Lynch, 137 S. Ct. 685 (2017); 
Ponce-Osorio v. Johnson, 824 F.3d 502, 506–07 (5th Cir. 
2016); Luna-Garcia v. Holder, 777 F.3d 1182, 1185–86 (10th 
Cir. 2015); Ortiz-Alfaro v. Holder, 694 F.3d 955, 958 (9th 
Cir. 2012); but see Padilla-Ramirez v. Bible, 882 F.3d 826, 
832 (9th Cir. 2017). See also Shehu v. Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 
652, 656 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that an order is final when 
the alien is entitled to “no further process” before they are 
removed). Granted, Guerrero-Sanchez’s removal order has 
been reinstated, and thus not subject to appeal. Nonetheless, it 
is not final in the true sense of the word.3  
                                              
2 Although we have construed § 1231(a)(6) to require a bond 
hearing after prolonged detention, § 1226(a) requires such a 
hearing at the outset to determine whether an alien can be 
detained, so the application of one section versus the other 
has significant ramifications. 
3 First, an alien subject to a reinstated removal order may not 
be removed from the United States until withholding 
proceedings have concluded and administrative proceedings 
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As the Majority notes, Guerrero-Sanchez was detained 
under § 1231(a)(6) for 637 days (approximately 21 months) 
while his withholding proceedings remained, and continue to 
remain, pending. Guerrero-Sanchez was detained by ICE in 
May of 2015 and his withholding-only proceedings are 
scheduled for September 5, 2019, after which it may take 
months for a final decision to be issued, subject to further 
appeals. Thus, Guerrero-Sanchez would potentially have been 
detained for over four years absent a bond hearing and grant 
                                                                                                     
are truly final. Second, practically speaking, if an alien is 
granted withholding of removal to the designated country, he 
may never be removed at all, and thus removal contemplated 
by § 1231(a) is even less certain. Here, if Guerrero-Sanchez is 
granted withholding of removal to Mexico based on his 
reasonable fear of future persecution or his CAT claim, he 
may never be removed from the United States. Although 
prevailing on a withholding or CAT claim “would not 
prohibit [Guerrero-Sanchez’s] removal from the United States 
to an alternative, non-risk country,” Majority Opinion at 16, 
actual removal to a third, alternate country is rare. To do so, 
the U.S. Government must show a tie between the alien and 
the third country to satisfy the requirements of 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1231(b)(2)(D) and (E), and that country must also be 
willing to accept the alien. See, e.g., Himri v. Ashcroft, 378 
F.3d 932, 936–38 (9th Cir. 2004) (the government did not 
carry its burden of showing that petitioners, Palestinians who 
lived in Kuwait but had Jordanian passports, who were 
entitled to withholding of removal to Kuwait, were removable 
to Jordan, nor did the government show that Jordan would be 
willing to accept petitioners). Often, no such alternate country 
exists, and the alien who is granted withholding of removal 
remains in the United States indefinitely.  
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of release. Alternatively, an initial bond hearing under § 
1226(a) would release those aliens who should not be 
detained—those who neither pose a risk of flight nor danger 
to their communities—without detaining them for over 6 
months before they can raise a due process challenge to the 
prolonged nature of their detention.4 See Majority Opinion at 
35-38.  
 
 Thus, I urge that legislative action is needed to clarify 
whether someone in Guerrero-Sanchez’s position is 
statutorily entitled to a bond hearing. 
                                              
4 Although I recognize that the application of § 1226 to 
Guerrero-Sanchez would not automatically afford him a bond 
hearing due to his criminal conviction, see Majority Opinion 
at 17 n.6, mandatory detention under either section for many 
months, even years, could raise serious due process concerns. 
